The FBI has been unable to access a Washington Post reporter’s seized iPhone because it was in Lockdown Mode, a sometimes overlooked feature that makes iPhones broadly more secure, according to recently filed court records.
The court record shows what devices and data the FBI was able to ultimately access, and which devices it could not, after raiding the home of the reporter, Hannah Natanson, in January as part of an investigation into leaks of classified information. It also provides rare insight into the apparent effectiveness of Lockdown Mode, or at least how effective it might be before the FBI may try other techniques to access the device.
“Because the iPhone was in Lockdown mode, CART could not extract that device,” the court record reads, referring to the FBI’s Computer Analysis Response Team, a unit focused on performing forensic analyses of seized devices. The document is written by the government, and is opposing the return of Natanson’s devices.
Archive: http://archive.today/gfTg9
And the FBI can’t get in? I doubt that. It has always been notoriously easy for law enforcement to get in to Android phones.
Obligatory XKCD.
Everyone have different thread model…
It’s usually either posix or windows… is
pthreadposix? They confuse me when i’m outta coffee.If someone is worried about the FBI I don’t think that putting trust in a US company who’s CEO has very close ties to the current US administration is a wise idea.
I’d be seeking hardware to run an OS like GrapheneOS. Going with iOS in the US seems as wise as someone in China going with Xiaomi if they are trying to go under the radar of China’s Ministry of State Security.
So the hardware made by the other company who’s CEO has very close ties to the current US administration.
Graphene looks promising but restricting it to Pixels kinda kills it for me.
Hardware is hardware. Whether it is US, China, etc the most vital component ends up being the OS at the end. It is the OS that you are entrusting the programs and apps being run and the accounts being logged into.
If you want security and privacy, grapheneOS appears to be the best option for OS. Something can be secure but not private, and private but not secure. Example being running /e/os or lineageOS on supported hardware might be more private but might not be as secure as stock Google on a Pixel or iOS with lot of times inability to relock the bootloader.
Phones do not have the luxury of PCs with large range of supported hardware with lot of freedom to install different operating systems without issue. There isn’t a luxury of the perfect private and secure phone to purchase.
You look among what is available to find what lets you install a non corporate run OS that is as secure as possible.
Under Kash Patel, I’d be surprised if the FBI could unlock a Mime’s door, let alone a phone.
Haha, very true. Loyalty over competency.
Even if you turned the phone off? It should be secure on a cold boot before entering the password, as nothing is unencrypted yet.
You know, I have not kept up. Things may have improved recently. But historically there’s always been flaws in the security.
And that is the big reason why you should update. It’s a cat and mouse situation. This is the reason why GrapheneOS offer security previews and encourage you to install them.
GrapheneOS is not the ordinary Android phone.